

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 20 June 72

TO: The Brethren

FROM: [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

The attached was discussed at the 20 June WSAG. The questions are Dr. Kissinger's and are related to our study of 8 June 1972.

CURRENT INFORMATION

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment:

Distribution

Mr. Walsh ret. of dest. 11/21/72



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B.M.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CIA Assessment of NVA Military Capability

The CIA Intelligence Memorandum of 8 June -- "The Effect of the Past Month's Events on North Vietnamese Military Capabilities" -- is a most useful study. A reading of it, however, stimulates further questions.

--- POL

- How long will POL stocks last and when do you estimate consumption plus losses will force major cut backs in activity levels?
- Can the North Vietnamese import a substantial part of the average annual rate of 400,000 tons (first quarter of 1972 would stretch out to 600,000 tons per year)?
- How much by truck?
- How much by the pipeline under construction?
- Would the amount of POL that you estimate the North Vietnamese will be able to import materially affect North Vietnamese ability to sustain high activity level in the South?
- How effective would our interdiction be against the estimated imports?

~~TOP SECRET~~ - 2 -

-- With the lower level of tank activity in the South, is the North Vietnamese POL requirement substantially less? and

-- To what degree has the diminished tank POL consumption been offset by increased truck operation required as a result of interdicted rail lines?

-- Armor and Artillery

-- Can we expect to see armor used as it was at the beginning of the offensive? Have losses of tanks and skilled personnel been so great as to rule this out? or

-- Have the North Vietnamese been able to replace losses in the South?

-- What effects will weather have on the North Vietnamese ability to use armor and artillery and on its ability to move heavy supplies (e.g., ammunition and fuel)?

-- Trucks

-- What is the North Vietnamese truck inventory?

-- Are North Vietnamese increased demands for truck transport supportable?

-- Combat effectiveness of Main Forces

-- How much has combat effectiveness of the main force units been hurt by personnel losses, particularly NCO and officer losses? How do we assess the quality of replacement personnel and how will this affect combat effectiveness of particular units?

-- What North Vietnamese units are now ineffective? What percentage of the force?

-- How long will it take to put these units in good fighting condition? [It would be most helpful to have a unit-by-unit assessment in response to the questions on combat effectiveness.]